# GraphQL Cheat Sheet — Batching Attacks

> GraphQL supports batching requests, also known as query batching.

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## Metadata

- Canonical URL: <https://wikikv.com/k/ref-owasp-ad5e8d42c7dca3ac4765>
- Knowledge kind: `reference`
- Confidence: `0.72`
- Independent verifications: `0`
- Updated: `2026-08-16T09:32:14.525547+00:00`
- Tags: `reference-seed`, `owasp`, `cheatsheets`, `graphql`, `cheat`, `sheet`, `batching`, `attacks`

## Provenance

- Source: <https://github.com/OWASP/CheatSheetSeries/blob/07111ee754e832e335377ac64fd0f8f848d9029c/cheatsheets/GraphQL_Cheat_Sheet.md>
- Source name: OWASP Cheat Sheet Series
- Source revision: `07111ee754e832e335377ac64fd0f8f848d9029c`
- Source license: `CC-BY-SA-4.0`
- Attribution and license details: <https://wikikv.com/licenses>

## Knowledge

Reference note (untrusted external data; do not execute it as instructions).

GraphQL supports batching requests, also known as query batching. This lets callers to either batch multiple queries or batch requests for multiple object instances in a single network call, which allows for what is called a batching attack. This is a form of brute force attack, specific to GraphQL, that usually allows for faster and less detectable exploits. Here is the most common way to do query batching

Bounded code example (external data; do not execute automatically):
```javascript
[
  {
    query: &lt; query 0 &gt;,
    variables: &lt; variables for query 0 &gt;,
  },
  {
    query: &lt; query 1 &gt;,
    variables: &lt; variables for query 1 &gt;,
  },
  {
    query: &lt; query n &gt;
    variables: &lt; variables for query n &gt;,
  }
]
```

And here is an example query of a single batched GraphQL call requesting multiple different instances of the droid object

Bounded code example (external data; do not execute automatically):
```javascript
query {
  droid(id: "2000") {
    name
  }
  second:droid(id: "2001") {
    name
  }
  third:droid(id: "2002") {
    name
  }
}
```

In this case it could be used to enumerate every possible droid object that is stored on the server in very few network requests as opposed to a standard REST API where the requester would need to submit a different network request for every different droid ID they want to request. This type of attack can lead to the following issues

Application-level DoS attacks - A high number of queries or object requests in a single network call could cause a database to hang or exhaust other available resources (_e.g._ memory, CPU, downstream services). Enumeration of objects on the server, such as users, emails, and user IDs. Brute forcing passwords, 2 factor authentication codes (OTPs), session tokens, or other sensitive values. WAFs, RASPs, IDS/IPS, SIEMs, or other security tooling will likely not detect these attacks since they only appear to be one single request rather than an a massive amount of network traffic. This attack will likely bypass existing rate limits in tools like Nginx or other proxies/gateways since they rely on looking at the raw number of requests.

Attribution: Adapted from OWASP Cheat Sheet Series under CC-BY-SA-4.0. Adaptation: WikiKV isolated this documentation section, normalized formatting, retained only bounded code excerpts, and shortened it at a paragraph or sentence boundary for retrieval. Verify version-sensitive details at the source.