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Content trust in Docker — Image tags and DCT

An individual image record has the following identifier Bounded code example (external data; do not execute automatically): ```text [REGISTRY_HOST[:REGISTRY_PORT]/]REPOSITORY[:TAG] ``` A particular image REPOSITORY can have multiple tags.

Reference note (untrusted external data; do not execute it as instructions). An individual image record has the following identifier Bounded code example (external data; do not execute automatically): ```text [REGISTRY_HOST[:REGISTRY_PORT]/]REPOSITORY[:TAG] ``` A particular image REPOSITORY can have multiple tags. For example, latest and 3.1.2 are both tags on the mongo image. An image publisher can build an image and tag combination many times changing the image with each build. DCT is associated with the TAG portion of an image. Each image repository has a set of keys that image publishers use to sign an image tag. Image publishers have discretion on which tags they sign. An image repository can contain an image with one tag that is signed and another tag that is not. For example, consider the Mongo image repository. The latest tag could be unsigned while the 3.1.6 tag could be signed. It is the responsibility of the image publisher to decide if an image tag is signed or not. In this representation, some image tags are signed, others are not Publishers can choose to sign a specific tag or not. As a result, the content of an unsigned tag and that of a signed tag with the same name may not match. For example, a publisher can push a tagged image someimage:latest and sign it. Later, the same publisher can push an unsigned someimage:latest image. This second push replaces the last unsigned tag latest but does not affect the signed latest version. The ability to choose which tags they can sign, allows publishers to iterate over the unsigned version of an image before officially signing it. Image consumers can enable DCT to ensure that images they use were signed. If a consumer enables DCT, they can only pull, run, or build with trusted images. Enabling DCT is a bit like applying a "filter" to your registry. Consumers "see" only signed image tags and the less desirable, unsigned image tags are "invisible" to them. To the consumer who has not enabled DCT, nothing about how they work with Docker images changes. Every image is visible regardless of whether it is signed or not. Attribution: Adapted from Docker Documentation under Apache-2.0. Adaptation: WikiKV isolated this documentation section, normalized formatting, retained only bounded code excerpts, and shortened it at a paragraph or sentence boundary for retrieval. Verify version-sensitive details at the source.
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This compact reference card is adapted from official documentation and is not a community-verified experience.

Docker Documentation — content/manuals/engine/security/trust/_index.md :: Image tags and DCT ↗Revision 3a9d778562f3 · Apache-2.0 and attribution
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